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Editorial Notes

Henceforth, for the duration, LAND POLICY REVIEW will be published quarterly. The next number will appear in September, and there will be a new editor.

CONTRIBUTORS: JOHN D. BLACK, professor of economics in Howard University, is widely known among agricultural workers. His present article presents an analysis that fits in with his treatment of the subject of parity prices in war, due for early publication by the Harvard Committee on Economic Research under the title, *Parity Prices—and the War.*

MARION CLAWSON, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was the Department's representative on the Columbia Basin Joint Investigation.

GEORGE DYKHUIZEN is professor of philosophy in the University of Vermont. His article is an outgrowth of a speech he gave last year at a school of philosophy sponsored by the BAE division of program study and discussion. Almost every aspect of our lives has changed since he gave the talk, but it is well to remind ourselves periodically of the points he made.

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PRODUCTION GOALS *and Good Land Use*

By A. M. MEYERS, JR. *Four ways are suggested here to obtain needed farm production and insure better land use at the same time.*

THE SECRETARY of Agriculture has called for increases in the production of specific agricultural products, especially dairy products, oil-bearing crops like peanuts and soybeans, dry beans and peas, and certain commercial truck crops. The goals for 1942 are high, and these, plus anticipated acreages of nongoal crops, total approximately 13,000,000 more crop acres than in 1941. Wheat is the only product for which the 1942 goal is lower than 1941 acreage.

Presumably, goals at least as great as those for 1942 will be needed in subsequent years until the war has been won and as long as the United States aids in the rehabilitation of devastated countries. Even then the domestic demand for agricultural products—stimulated by a larger population and greater attention to the attainment of improved dietary and other welfare standards—will probably be greater than ever.

During the past several pre-war years, the Department of Agriculture has devoted a large share of its energies to the promotion of certain long-range adjustments in agriculture, one of the most important of which has been improved use of our land resources.

These desirable long-range adjustments must not be ignored or forgotten, even though urgently needed wartime expansion does demand primary attention. The consequences of such neglect would be failure to progress toward long-time goals of better land use and increased production efficiency, and, even more serious, constant reduction of potential productivity through permanent resource damage. Furthermore, a repetition of the agricultural troubles that followed the first World War would be encouraged. These considera-

tions are of particular significance in the light of possibilities for a long war.

There are only two situations in which long-time and short-time objectives would become truly irreconcilable and in which long-time goals could justly be ignored:

(1) In the event such a large volume of production becomes essential to win the war and save the peace that the land resource base must be depleted for the sake of increased present production (assuming that such depletion would actually result in greater production during and immediately after the war).

(2) In the event production must be expanded so hurriedly that appropriate attention cannot be given to any but the most expeditious means of expanding production. It is extremely unlikely that we are currently faced with either of these situations. The direction of our efforts now may determine whether we shall ultimately be faced with them. At any rate, the possibilities of pursuing long-time and short-time goals simultaneously should be exhausted before the longer view is sacrificed for the shorter. If it becomes necessary to deplete the resource base to win the war, then that must be done without hesitation or regret. But knowledge gained in production-planning efforts may be used to guide production within the limits of resource depletion rather than permitting unwarranted resource deterioration.

Investigate

In the light of these considerations, therefore, it is essential to investigate and appraise the possibilities of getting the increased production without using our land resources less well than at present, and if possible, of increasing production and good land use, too.

According to estimates made in pages 94–96 of the 1938 Yearbook of Agriculture, about 161,000,000 acres then in cultivation were suitable for cultivation, assuming current soil conservation practices. That amounts to about 40 percent of the approximately 399,000,000 planted, idle, and fallow acres in the United States in 1939. An additional 45 percent of the cultivated acreage, however, could be kept in cultivation without damaging the resource base if the best soil conservation measures are substituted for current practices, making a total of 339,000,000 acres suitable for cultivation, assuming the best conservation practices.

But although the widespread need for soil-conserving practices is thus manifest, it was also estimated in the 1938 Yearbook that almost 60,000,000 acres—15 percent of the 1939 planted, idle, and fallow acres—needed to be retired from cultivation and placed in pasture or timber uses. (In 1936, about one-fourth of the land in cultivation which was not suited to cultivation was on farms that should be retired from crop farming; the remainder of the cultivated land not suited to cultivation was land that should be shifted from crops to pasture and farm woodland.)

If these 60,000,000 acres were retired, crop production from them would have to be made up by bringing noncultivated land into cultivation, or by increasing yields on the cultivated acres, or both. Inasmuch as the 60,000,000 acres that should

be retired are of less than average productivity, fewer acres of greater productivity would be needed to replace them. The Land Planning Committee of the National Resources Planning Board estimated in 1935 that the 20,000,000 crop acres then recommended for retirement were "only two-thirds as productive as the average cropland of the country as a whole."

If a more conservative estimate of 80 percent of average productivity be applied to the 60,000,000 acres, the production equivalent of 48,000,000 average crop acres would be necessary to replace the production of the retired acreage. These acres would have to be retired over a period of several years, but progress can be made now, with the land being developed to give needed pasture acreage where that is feasible.

61,000,000 Acres

Besides, the anticipated increases in nongoal crops plus 1942 acreage goals for goal crops total about 13,000,000 more acres than were in cultivation in 1941. Assuming that approximately the same acreage was cultivated in 1941 as in 1939, production equivalent to somewhat less than 61,000,000 crop acres (48,000,000 plus 13,000,000 acres) must be obtained by cultivating land formerly not in cultivation, or by increasing yields on the cultivated acres or by a combination of the two.

The Yearbook estimates also indicated that about 22,000,000 acres then in plowable pasture were suited to cultivation if current soil conservation practices were followed, while almost 53,000,000 plowable pasture acres could be safely cultivated if the best soil conservation practices were followed.

Under the latter conditions, production equivalent to the harvest from about 8,000,000 acres, or 2 percent of the 1939 planted, idle, and fallow acreage, would still be wanting, assuming no increase in yields and no reduction in the proportion of cropland idle or fallow.

It is essential to note also that because pasture acreage will be sorely needed in cattle and dairy production any decreases in present pasture acreage through cultivation of pasture suited to crops will likely need to be made up by pasture improvement and conversion to pasture of land now in crops but not suited to cultivation. Actually, the conversion of plowable pasture to cropland might seriously disturb the production program in dairy areas. The possibilities of obtaining substantial pasture improvements on land not suited to cultivation and of making the numerous shifts in crops that would be essential to effective pasture conversion would have to be considered carefully.

Shifts in Crop Uses

Numerous shifts in crop uses on land adapted to cultivation also will be necessary, but it is not possible to relate them to the Yearbook data. These generally are intrafarm shifts, but they are of great importance. Some will need to be extensive enough to cause significant changes in the agricultural patterns of some areas.

Assuming the cultivation of plowable pasture and the accomplishment of necessary shifts in crop uses on land adapted to cultivation, can

the additional 2-percent production needed conceivably be made up by greater production from the acreage suited to cultivation, or will it be necessary to clear, drain, or irrigate "new lands" or to cultivate land unadapted to the purpose?

If goals are raised in subsequent years, how much of the goal can be reached by yield increases? A 2-percent increase in yields is almost insignificant. If corn yields were boosted 2 percent from an average 27.5 bushels an acre—the 5-year national average for 1935, 1937, 1938, 1939, and 1940—the increase would amount to somewhat more than one-half bushel an acre. The same percentage increase in wheat yields would amount to approximately one-fourth bushel per acre. (Although increases in wheat production are not needed in 1942, increases per acre would mean fewer acres needed for wheat, thus releasing land, labor, and equipment for production of other crops.)

Even increases as high as 5–10 percent do not seem to be unfeasible. Such increases on a national basis would call for careful husbandry, but they are well within the realm of possibility. The national average cotton yield of 0.35 bale an acre in 1926–30 was raised to half a bale to the acre—an increase of 43 percent—in 1936–40.

These increases were brought about even though a smaller acreage was cultivated and despite a decline in cotton prices from an average of 15.4 cents during the earlier period to 9.6 cents during the 1936–40 period.

Further Stimulus

With the present high prices for agricultural commodities, further stimulus to greater acre production is provided. Further, in the 1938 Yearbook of Agriculture, it is stated, "In practically all instances, it is safe to assume that good soil-conservation practices will increase production in the aggregate." There seems little doubt that better cultural practices, high prices, and conservational use could make considerable yield increases feasible, providing obstacles to that greater production—such as labor and fertilizer shortages—do not materialize or can be effectively alleviated.

Idle Land

It also seems probable that the percentage of land idle or fallow might be reduced.

In 1929, more than 41,000,000 crop acres, or 10 percent of all cropland lay idle or fallow. By 1939 this acreage had been increased by more than 15,000,000 acres to a total of almost 57,000,000 acres—14.3 percent of all cropland. In 20 States, the percentage of such land decreased during this period; in 18 more, the increase was less than 5 percent. In 10 States, North Dakota, Montana, Kansas, South Dakota, Colorado, Nebraska, Texas, Wyoming, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, however, increases of from 5.1 percent to 19.1 percent are recorded. These States are all in the Great Plains, and it must be realized that a certain percentage of land in fallow is recognized as good production management.

The important thing to note here is the tremendous increase of acreage in idle and fallow land. Much of this land was probably formerly planted to wheat. The possibilities for increased production consistent

with good land use in the Great Plains may lie in greater production of sorghums (Southern Plains) and the development of grass stands on land formerly used for wheat but now idle.

On the other hand, greater production of wheat on an increased acreage carefully selected for the purpose may be the answer if wheat allotments to other parts of the country can be correspondingly reduced in favor of other crops without risking unwarranted soil depletion or higher costs.

In other States, however, even in the Corn Belt, there are idle fields and idle tracts. Idle and fallow land in Iowa increased from 1 percent of all cropland in 1929 to 3.9 percent in 1939. In only three States, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Vermont was less than 5 percent of all cropland idle and fallow. Much idle land not adapted to crops may be used for pasture. More efficient use of these idle acres would doubtless add considerably to total production.

If even greater increases in production are ultimately necessary, and it becomes uneconomic or impractical to obtain them through greater yields per acre or more efficient use of land now idle, between 55,000,000 and 56,000,000 acres not in cultivation would be suitable for cultivation if cleared, drained, or irrigated.

These acres could not all be brought into production immediately and the period necessary for the development of even the more feasible development possibilities varies from 1 year to as many as 10 or more. Furthermore, the costs of reclamation may prohibit this development during wartime.

How to Get Both

Thus, we can obtain our needed production and better land use, too, if we find ways to put the best conservation practices into effect on cultivated land and plowable pasture suited to cultivation under these practices, increase yields per acre within feasible limits, lower the percentage of land lying idle, and bring undeveloped land suitable for cultivation under best conservation practices into use as production from present developed acres is outrun by greater demands for agricultural products.

Members of regional, State, and local production-planning groups will want to ask themselves several questions about their areas: How much farm land is in an adapted use and producing as much as is economically feasible? How many farm acres are "lazy acres" where use should be shifted or where better practices would increase production? How many farm tracts now lying idle are suitable for farm use and might be returned to economical production? How much undeveloped land can be brought into production soon enough to be effective in agriculture's contribution to the war effort? Where are these inefficiently used or unused acres located?

Suggestions

What specific things can be done to insure movement in the direction of greater production and good land use, too?

Here are a few suggestions:

Allocate production goals for agricultural areas and for individual farms on the basis of best estimates

of production potentials. These potentials are determined primarily by land, water, and climate, while production and management practices, market factors, and a host of institutional factors, like size of farm and tenure arrangements, are factors which limit the realization of the full potentialities. Different levels of efficiency in any of these factors result in different production potentials. At least three levels of production efficiency might be assumed to show the range in production potentials. These levels could include the current situation, feasible improvements or those that might be expected in the next year or two, and an ultimate potential based on best estimate of ideal agricultural adjustment. Goals should be set in accordance with the "feasible production level." This level may be revised from year to year as conditions affecting it vary, while the ultimate production potential should be expected to change only slowly over a longer period.

Revise public programs so that they encourage the desired direction of land-use change insofar as possible and still meet war needs. Additional attention may need to be devoted to bringing about desirable land-use shifts and the adoption of conservation practices. Penalties also might be placed on idle land, "lazy acres," and poor production practices.

Allocate supplies of soil amendments, agricultural labor, and agricultural machinery to the areas and farms that can make most effective use of them in increasing total production.

Study factors that cause the "feasible production level" to be lower than the "ultimate production potential" and instigate steps to eliminate these obstacles. Many of these factors of an institutional character, like tenure, credit arrangements, and size of farms, can be influenced by existing public programs.

I sincerely hope to see the cooperative movement greatly strengthened in the years to come. For the cooperative movement flourishes with democracy and it can help to keep democracy vital and dynamic. The cooperative movement in the United States is still young. It is still growing. It has almost unlimited potentialities. But we might as well recognize that its future, like the future of so many of the institutions we love, is bound up with the future of democracy.

—CLAUDE R. WICKARD

GUIDING AGRICULTURAL *War Production*

By NEIL W. JOHNSON. *Here is a broad picture of what the Department is trying to do in its 1943 production capabilities project.*

AS DRAMATIC as industry's titanic effort to retool for mass production of war implements is the retooling that is taking place in 6,000,000 other plants of strategic importance—American farms. Farmers, too, are becoming familiar with *production goals.*

Why should agriculture be so closely supervised and why should anyone give thought to goals in the production of farm goods? Surely rising prices of farm products and the aroused patriotism of farmers everywhere can be depended upon to produce foods of every type in abundance for ourselves and for those who stand beside us in this war.

One of the reasons for organizing for the battle of food is found in a terse statement from the Secretary's office:

"The 1942 goals for agriculture call for the largest production in the history of agriculture. If they are met in entirety the volume of production will be 6 percent larger than in 1941, and 19 percent larger than the average from 1935 to 1939." Compare this with the fact that the *total* increase in agricultural production from the period 1910–14 to 1918–19 was about 8 percent. The size of the task is further magnified by the dwindling supply of farm labor, a tightening of restrictions on the supplies of nitrogenous fertilizers, a shortage of new farm machinery, and other obstacles.

Another reason is that we need some agricultural products much worse than we do others. The Nation's storage bins are already bulging with wheat, for instance, and the 1942 crop is expected to round out a supply equivalent to the normal needs of the country for 2 full years. The need for soybeans, on the other hand, together with flaxseed and peanuts, our oil-producing crops, is acute. Furthermore, care must be exercised in locating the new acreages of soybeans because they leave the soil especially vulnerable to erosion. Unguided effort here could result in the same type of damage to some of our more productive soils that occurred during the last world conflict when large acreages of good range land were sacrificed for the sake of more wheat.

The American farmer will not hesitate to make sacrifices. The role of the Department, our State colleges, and Extension Services is that of guiding his effort so only needed sacrifices are made and, where possible, that these are not of irreparable nature.

Production goals for 1942 were first announced last September. Revisions in both national and State

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goals were made in January, but the Secretary realized the need for enlisting the aid of farmers and agricultural workers everywhere to provide the understanding needed for effective administration of the Food For Freedom Program.

Accordingly, he issued a memorandum on March 2 requesting "• • • the Bureau of Agricultural Economics to assume the responsibility, through appropriate interbureau committees, for the general planning needed to bring about the most effective use of our total agricultural resources in the war effort."

As a result, personnel from the Federal Extension Service, the Agricultural Conservation and Adjustment Administration, the Farm Security Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, the Agricultural Marketing Administration, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Plant Industry, the Office of Agricultural War Relations, and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the Department of Agriculture and the Agricultural Experiment Station and the Agricultural Extension Service in each State are joining with a limited number of farmers in mapping an effective campaign for the task ahead in 1943.

The Supply Side

Secretary Wickard said further: "Work along these lines should provide an inventory of our production capacity and also a basis for distributing future production goals among different areas in such a way that all farmers can make their maximum contributions to the Food For Freedom Program."

The intent of the project, then, is not one of goal establishment, although the results of the work, insofar as they reflect accurately the levels of production that appear feasible and potential for 1943, will be taken into consideration in establishing goals. The project is primarily directed toward a better understanding of the supply side of the agricultural picture while goal establishment involves the demand side as well—a demand that shifts with the torpedoing of every Allied ship and that changes significantly with every successful Axis conquest.

Major emphasis in the work is being placed rather on production capacity in agriculture—not capacity in the abstract but for the vital war commodities we need now and will continue to need—soybeans, peanuts, and flaxseed for oil, dried and evaporated milk, cheese, dried whole eggs, canned and cured pork products, canned tomatoes and peas, among others.

The possibilities in physical expansion of these products is an important consideration, and State and Federal soil scientists and production specialists are doing a fine job of pointing out the lands that are adapted to greater intensity of use in the war effort. They are performing another useful function in emphasizing the cropping practices and methods of livestock feeding and management that along with shifts in and expansion of crop acreage will swell the total volume of production.

In and of themselves these phases are highly important, yet they provide only a partial basis for administering an effective program of wartime agriculture.

Needed is a good understanding of conditions within the 6 million farm plants previously mentioned,

and the amount of retooling that is necessary and possible in 1943 to attain the desired levels of production. This information cannot be gotten in the specific definitive fashion needed for determination of agricultural policy by counseling with farmers in large mass meetings.

The picture would likely be confused because of the diverse interests represented. In this project farmer contact is being limited to small groups of half a dozen selected farmers, each group representative of a farming situation of importance within a sample county that is likewise chosen to be representative of a larger adjustment area.

In the war emergency, because of lack of background data, informal methods must be employed in determination of farms representative of groups and sample counties representative of larger areas. Previous studies frequently provide a basis for the sampling that is necessary. Inspection of AAA records and assessor's data are other sources. The judgment of agricultural workers, local bankers, and others of long familiarity with local areas is also being utilized. If judgment and experience are largely relied upon as the basis for sampling, then judgment and experience must likewise be employed in evaluating results. Dependence wholly upon statistical manipulation of such data is likely to lead to erroneous conclusions.

Obstacles

State and Federal agricultural workers sit down with these small groups on successive days and from these conferences gain an understanding of the varying impact of the Food For Freedom Program on the 6-cow dairy on upland soils as contrasted with the 40-cow dairy on bottom land—on the 160-acre diversified Iowa farm on soil both level and fertile, as contrasted with conditions on 320 acres of Great Plains wheat land of limited and uncertain productivity.

Then, by knowing something of the relative importance of these different kinds of farming situations, we are in a better position to estimate the degree to which farmers generally will be able to respond to requests for increased production and greater farming efficiency.

All Farmers

An important phase of the current attempt to understand better the more important farming situations as a basis for action programs is that of studying obstacles that stand in the way of goal achievement. This, of course, begins with obstacles confronting farmers in reaching 1942 goals, with attention to those likely to carry over and possibly worsen in another year. Special attention is being given to classification of these obstacles according to the types of action needed to overcome them. Farmers individually or in groups will be able to surmount many of these obstacles, but others can only be removed through Government action. Thus, by counseling with representatives from the diverse farming situations in the length and breadth of the land, looking into their production problems, anticipating their needs, and assisting where possible, there lies the assurance of a smoothly working, well-oiled assembly line in agriculture.

Having obtained a good understanding of the production capacities

of not only areas but of typical farm plants within these areas, how do we carry out the second part of the Secretary's charge, that of providing, ". . . a basis for distributing future production goals among different areas in such a way that *all farmers* can make their maximum contributions to the Food For Freedom Program"?

The wisdom with which goals can be distributed among areas will depend largely upon how good a job is done of exploring 1943 production capacity in each locality. This will in turn depend partially upon work done in previous years and that which can be done within each area between completion of the State report (June 30), and the time when 1943 goals will be distributed in the fall.

As a result of the study, we can hope for a better basis for distribution of goals among areas than has prevailed heretofore and a better understanding of the farming situations within these areas. There remains the problem of translation of goals for areas into the production plans of individual farms—the shift from the blueprint to the action stage of production. This is a phase of utmost importance upon which work has already been done but the lines of effective action for national application of farm plans still are not clear.

How to assist farmers in making 6,000,000 effective farm plans—plans that will reflect the needs of the Nation, safeguard farms against unwarranted and irreparable depletion, maintain the level of living to which citizens of a democracy aspire, and plans that will be carried through to final accomplishment. These are problems growing out of the 1943 War Production Goals Project, the solution of which must be found before the task can be considered successfully completed.

Before all else we must learn how to use our American earth wisely with the greatest possible benefits to all. . . .

—Carleton Beals

Nations come and go. Kings rise and fall. Millionaires come into being and are destroyed overnight, but we, the Earth and the people go on forever.

—Louis Bromfield

The fabric of human life has been woven on earthen looms. It everywhere smells of the clay.

—J. H. Bradley

WHAT'S IN STORE FOR *The Western Third?*

By MARION CLAWSON. *Expansion of productive capacity, population growth, and loss of outside competitive strength are predicted for the Western third of the United States after the war. But there will be new opportunities, this writer says, and "Let's make the most of them."*

GREAT CHANGES are bound to come to the Western one-third of the United States after the war. The dynamics will come partly from within agriculture, and partly from impending developments in other parts of the economy. Agriculture is still growing in the West, however full grown it is elsewhere; the population is increasing at a faster rate than in other regions; industry is developing rapidly, and the West is losing its comparative advantage in many of the high-value, specialty crops for Eastern markets.

Farm productive capacity in the Pacific Slope, the area west of the Continental Divide, will increase primarily through irrigation development, which will be of two types, "new land," where water is made available to previously unirrigated land, and supplemental irrigation, by which a larger and more dependable water supply is made available to lands previously irrigated.

In connection with the current Columbia Basin Joint Investigation, the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior has made some estimates of the probable extent of its program in the next 2 or 3 decades. Some of the larger and more imminent new-land projects are the Gila project in Arizona, 135,000 acres; the All-American Canal in California, 260,000 acres; the Deschutes project in Oregon, 50,000 acres; the Yakima-Roza project in Washington, 72,000 acres; and the Boise-Payette project in Idaho, 50,000 acres. The larger and more imminent supplemental water developments are the Central Valley project in California, 600,000 acres, and the Boise Valley project in Idaho, 320,000 acres.

There is, also, the great Columbia Basin project of 1,200,000 acres of new land. All the projects of the Bureau of Reclamation in the Pacific Slope may include 400,000 to 600,000 acres of supplemental irrigation and 225,000 to 400,000 acres of new land in each 5-year period following the war, and there may be sizeable irrigation developments under non-Federal auspices, besides rather large tracts of cut-over land that might be cleared.

How fast these developments will move in the post-war decades is hard to foresee. Much depends upon the degree of prosperity achieved with

out governmental aid and upon the extent and character of public programs. If depression develops or threatens (and we are trying to make that impossible), irrigation and land-clearing projects have two strong appeals: They provide direct and indirect employment during the construction period and they provide an economic opportunity for the settler.

In the event of a post-war boom, these types of appeal will be absent. But only the hardiest optimist believes that in the 2 decades immediately after the war there will be no need for large-scale public works and great need for settlement opportunities. These pertinent arguments, backed by proponents of irrigation development, are very likely to lead to major developments of agricultural resources in the Pacific Slope in the post-war period.

Uncertainty over the timing of this development makes it difficult to estimate its total extent in any given period. As a part of the Columbia Basin studies, an estimate of probable developments by 1970 was prepared last summer.

Productivity equivalent to a new irrigated acreage of 4,971,400 was estimated to result from various endeavors—the clearing of 563,000 acres of cut-over land in 1941–70 would be equivalent to 188,000 acres; 104,000 acres of drained land, to 35,000 acres; 3,301,525 acres of supplemental irrigation by the Bureau of Reclamation, to 660,000 acres; other projects, involving a total area of 1,500,000 acres, were estimated to have a productivity equivalent to a new irrigated acreage of 764,000. Included also were 3,324,000 acres of new land irrigation by the Bureau of Reclamation.

These estimates may prove to be wide of the mark, but they give a reasonable guide to the probable size of developments after the war. If public works are extremely large, the development may be increased far beyond this; if public works are small, this estimate may prove too high.

As a basis for comparison, it should be noted that the area of irrigated land from which crops are harvested in the Pacific Slope is now between 9,000,000 and 10,000,000 acres. The new land development will increase the agricultural productivity of the region by about 50 percent of the present productivity of irrigated lands of the region. If the dry-farm and nonirrigated croplands and rangelands were used as a base for comparisons, the increase would be relatively much smaller. The types of crops that will be grown on the new-land development are generally similar to those now grown on irrigated lands. Thus, the first major change predicted for agriculture in the far West is a major increase in productive capacity; the second has to do with the population outlook.

Population

Population in the Pacific slope increased 367 percent in 1900–40, the national increase was 72 percent. During the 1930's, population in the region increased 17 percent, compared to 7 percent in the United States. Not only is the rate of increase in the West slowing down, but also the actual numbers increased in the 1930's were much less than in the previous decade. The increase in the West has come primarily from migration into the re-

gion, since births and deaths about balance. Migration is particularly difficult to forecast, since it depends upon conditions in the area which people leave, as well as upon conditions in the area to which they go. Migration to the Pacific Slope was substantially less in the 1930's than in the preceding decade—all the words about it to the contrary notwithstanding.

In the last year or two, the population has grown tremendously in certain Western defense areas. Only a relatively small part of this growth represents a net increase in population in the region, however, since many of the people moved from some place within the region. On the other hand, not all migrants to the Pacific slope moved to the defense areas. Judging by past experience, most of these migrants will stay even after the inducement which brought them to the region no longer exists.

War Plants

Industrial employment is increasing rapidly along the coast. The war industries, particularly aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding, have mushroomed. Some recession may occur from present employment in these industries, but some types of industrial activity undoubtedly can expand after the war. The aluminum, magnesium, and steel plants might all find profitable peacetime production. One favorable factor will be the large amount of cheap electric power available. An unfavorable factor for the future is the present heavy dependence on lumbering, which, in view of the depletion of timber stands, cannot hope to increase, and may readily decrease.

For the Columbia Basin studies, population forecasts for the period up to 1970 were made upon various assumptions. The most probable forecasts for 1970 ranged from 13,800,000 to 15,800,000; the 1940 population was 12,000,000. Thus the population growth will probably be about 3,000,000—in itself a sizeable market for the products of the 5,000,000 acres of new-land productivity.

These additional millions of people will require meat, cereals, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables. The past population growth has brought about certain changes in supply—cattle from western Texas are now shipped to Los Angeles, for instance, instead of being sent to Fort Worth or Kansas City. It seems reasonable to expect that future population growth will affect the supply areas and production for local markets.

The post-war decade may see extensive population shifts within the region. Even if industrial activity expands, some recession in the immediate post-war period and some shifts in employment are likely. If depression cannot be avoided, unemployment will be large. In any case, there will be some pressure of population upon agriculture.

With the development of various Federal programs, the situation may never again become so bad as in the early 1930's, but there will be an ample number of settlers for any land development that may take place. Although agriculture should not be expected to provide a livelihood to everyone who cannot find it elsewhere, there will be pressure upon agriculture to support a large population.

The third major item is the continuance of certain trends that have been in evidence for the past decade or so, and their intensification as a result of the increase in agricultural productivity and population.

The most important is the loss of competitive position by the far West in a number of specialty products, notably fruits, vegetables, and eggs. There has been a marked downward trend in shipments of some of these products in the past 10 years or so. At one time the Pacific Coast areas produced, and marketed in Eastern cities, a number of extra-quality products. With the lower prices of the past decade and the relatively high freight rates, the Western producer has received very little for these commodities.

One major factor in this decline has been the rise of strong competition, particularly on a quality basis, nearer the large urban markets. At one time, the highest quality and most dependable eggs came from the West; at the peak, 2,500,000 cases a year moved East. Now the poultrymen nearer the urban markets can produce and sell eggs of equally high quality and do it at a lower cost. Annual egg shipments to the East from the far West are now less than 1,000,000 cases.

Shipments of grapes from California are now only about half what they were 10 years ago; pear shipments from the Pacific slope are a fourth lower; and apple shipments from all Western States have declined a fourth in the past 10 or 15 years. In some cases where shipments have been maintained, like those of oranges and lemons, prices have fallen drastically. The total receipts from present crops are ordinarily much smaller than receipts from smaller crops formerly were.

The economic position of the Western fruit grower has not been good in the past decade. Good orchards generally could be purchased for less than the cost of developing a new orchard, even without taking into consideration the value of the raw land. This picture has not been uniform for all types of fruit or for all areas, but it has been widespread. Some of the producers of nuts have been in a similar position.

The Western range livestock industry has reached its full development. New land development, with large production of forage and grain, will provide the opportunity for a considerable increase in cattle and lamb fattening. New relations between the range and the irrigated areas may well grow out of the new large-scale irrigation developments.

Farm livestock products, such as dairy cows, hogs, meat-type chickens, and the like, will be produced in large volume on the new land. In some cases, the present routes from farm to consumer will be changed because of increased production. New outlets can and must be developed for these products.

The "revolution" thus has three phases: Expansion of productive capacity, growth of population and markets in the region, and loss of competitive strength outside. It will bring new problems to present farmers and to the public agencies that serve agriculture. We could not stop it if we would. But it is an expression of the traditional American urge for development and expansion, which is perhaps most virile in the West. It will also bring new opportunities, not only for growth but for adjustment. Let's make the most of them.

THE FARMER'S INTEREST IN *Wages* AND *Earnings*

By JOHN D. BLACK. *A noted economist considers a frequently asked question: "What about these figures on how factory wages and farm prices go up and down perfectly together?"*

THE NORMALLY reacting farmer does not applaud when someone proposes a general wage increase. He knows even without thinking that a wage increase will make him pay more for a job of carpentering the next time he repairs his barn or builds a silo, and that presently it will step up his truck and tractor repair bills and raise the price of farm machinery.

If he stops to think about it, he realizes that it will also raise his tax bill and widen the margin taken by the middleman agencies, processors, and railroads from what he sells as well as from what he buys. Finally, he understands that the cost of his own supply of hired labor is more or less tied in with the wages paid in cities roundabout him.

In recent years, however, a good many folk of one description or another have been trying to tell him that his normal reaction is wrong. Even government agencies have taken a hand in it. Several of them, for example, have had a hand in circulating among farmers one version or another of the now familiar *Parable of the Billions,* a recent statement of which is:

"In 1929, when pay rolls were $12,000,000,000 a year, farmers' incomes also totaled about $12,000,000,000. During the depression, farm incomes and pay rolls went down together, until in 1932 both stood at about $5,000,000,000 for the year. By the end of 1939, both had climbed back to a level of between $8,000,000,000 and $9,000,000,000. Farmers' incomes and industrial pay rolls rise and fall together!"

In the course of a 9 months' absence from academic cloisters last winter, spring, and summer, the writer talked individually to several hundred farmers and public servants of agriculture, and to several thousand in meetings and discussion groups. In all that time, in whichever of the 35 States he was in, no question was asked more often than this: "What about these figures on how factory wages and farm prices go up and down perfectly together? Can you give us the low-down on that?"

Obviously it is not an easy question to answer. It is as hard to figure out a way of stating the answer as it is to find the answer. Finally, the accompanying chart was devised. The solid line shows the movement of agricultural income—the "total revenue" curve the economists talk

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about. Then, there is a dotted line that shows how much of the changes in this total revenue are associated with changes in price level. The association is pretty close except in four periods: First, in the 4 pre-war years; second, at the peak of the last post-war secondary inflation; third, in the short depression afterwards; and, fourth, in the big depression and slow recovery from it since.

In two of these periods, most of the differences between the two lines are associated with a second factor, namely, *real income of the nonfarm population*. This is the cross-hatched part of the chart. The solid black parts of it represent periods when this real income factor helped in the wrong direction in explaining changes in farm incomes. They are not important and can be ignored for all practical purposes.

This chart makes very certain that the income of the nonfarm population is important in maintaining farm income in periods of general depression. All the available data on shares of the national income show that labor income holds up better than capital or agricultural income during depressions, and agriculture manages to get a slice of this because laborers' families keep up their food purchases.

There is nothing startling about this. It's exactly what one would expect. One always feels a little foolish when his statistical analyses reveal the obvious, but one who knows the vagaries of official statistics as well as the writer also gets a thrill out of it at times.

Relative Importance

The relative importance of price-level changes and real nonfarm income changes as influences on agricultural income can be stated as follows: In the decline in 1921–22 of $7,000,000,000 in agricultural revenue, $1,500,000,000 was associated with decline in real nonfarm income and $5,500,000,000 with a decline in general price level. Of the decline in 1929–32 of $7,000,000,000 of revenue, one-third, or $2,400,000,000, was associated with decline in real income. Of the $2,500,000,000 which agricultural revenue in 1937 was still short of the 1929 level, half was associated with lower price levels, a fourth with lower real income, and another fourth with something else.

Except in these depression periods, real nonfarm income and price levels have changed so nearly in parallel that it is not possible to separate the influences of the two.

The blank space on the chart represents changes in agricultural revenue that are not explained by either price level or nonfarm income changes. If space permitted, it could be shown that these gaps are closely associated with our foreign trade in agricultural products. In 1910–14, the United States had large exports which added significantly to agricultural income; in 1934–40, these exports have been far below the 1910–40 average. Introducing agricultural exports as another variable largely closes the remaining gaps.

Closer study of the variations in real nonfarm income reveals that they are associated very closely with employment and unemployment and less with hourly earnings of industrial labor. It is true that real nonfarm income can be increased by higher wage rates, as well as by more employment. But there is al-



ways danger that a rise in wage rates may prolong unemployment and reduce total nonfarm real income.

Two supplementary considerations reinforce the foregoing conclusions. One is that agriculture is more interested in better earnings for the poorest paid urban workers than for the better paid. It is the former group that expands its food purchases most with higher earnings. For the same reason it is interested in jobs for everybody.

The other reason is that full urban employment means an outlet in cities for the surplus population of the farms. The failure of industry to expand as it should since 1933 has been a very great burden upon the farm populations of many sections of the country. Any wage increases that retard industrial expansion are very hard upon agriculture.

Conclusive

The foregoing analysis seems clear-cut and conclusive. That is a way of writing that all of us fall back upon when we are aiming at the general reader. When we write as scientists, we qualify our statements until sometimes it seems as if nothing definite is left. In this case, it is at least necessary to say that when two factors are as closely intercorrelated as price-level changes and real non-farm-income changes, one cannot make a separation of these two "effects" that is absolute. Nevertheless, the analysis was made according to all the rules and approved practices.

Perhaps it is necessary to explain one or two details of procedure. The real nonfarm income used is money income adjusted for changes in the cost of living. The Bureau of Labor Statistics index numbers of wholesale prices were taken as a measure of general price level. The analysis takes account of the fact that farm prices move through a wider range than wholesale prices, dropping far-

ther in depressions and rising more rapidly in the boom periods.

It is admitted that using a wholesale price index as a measure of price level for this purpose is not satisfactory. The writer would gladly substitute a better one if it were available. But he insists that some kind of separation of price-level and real-income influences must be made. We have had in recent years enough construction of demand and revenue curves in terms of misleading dollar terms to lead a whole generation astray.

Agriculture's Gain

If space allowed, it would be interesting to analyze chronologically from 1918 to date the concurrent changes in agricultural revenue, price level, real nonfarm income, employment, and urban wages. Such an analysis would show that in only two brief periods has agriculture possibly gained from improved hourly earnings in addition to increasing employment These are 1922–25 and 1933–37. In 1918–21, 1925–28, 1930–32, and 1938–40, the relationship seems clearly to run the other way, very strongly so in 1918–21 and 1930–32.

The conclusion from the historical part of the analysis can be stated about as follows: Wages should rise when price level and/or real income or labor productivity rises, and only to the extent indicated by such rises. Furthermore, the gains from greater productivity must be passed on to agriculture in some measure as lower prices for industrial goods. Under these circumstances, agriculture will gain from wage increases. Under other circumstances, agriculture is very likely to lose from wage increases. Historically since the last war, most of the time agriculture has lost from wage increases, but has gained from increased urban employment.

Unity

I mean a sense of earth and skies and trees and rivers, not as a thing thought about but as a thing in me. I wanted earth in me and skies and fields and rivers and people. I wanted these things to come out of me, as song, as singing prose, as poetry, even. What else have I ever cared for as I have cared to have this happen, what woman, what possessions, what promise of life after death, all that? I have wanted this unity of things, this song, this earth, this sky, this human brotherhood.

—Sherwood Anderson

DO WE WANT *Cooperation* --- OR *Competition?*

By GEORGE DYKHUIZEN. *We want them both, says the writer, who does not believe we can make an either-or choice. It is a matter of expediency, and let us choose more of one and less of another as conditions warrant, always keeping in mind our democratic heritage of government of, by, and for the people.*

WE HEAR much talk these days about the comparative virtues of competition and cooperation. Some say we must have more competition in the better world we are fighting to build; some say cooperation is the order of the day. Each side urges us to believe that in its counsel lies the great white hope of the postwar world. Let us look at the facts.

The idea of competition, as it rose and flourished in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was part and parcel of a comprehensive social philosophy. We have dubbed it individualism. A glance at the principal ideas of the philosophy of individualism, therefore, should throw light on the general theory of competition.

The individual, according to this view, is a self-contained being who can only realize himself fully if allowed to live his life unhampered by external restraints. Society is simply an aggregate of these self-complete human atoms living together under various artificial social arrangements in order to gain certain advantages not otherwise attainable. These arrangements were thought to rest, either tacitly or expressly, on rational contracts.

Thus the family was viewed not as the natural outcome of the desires of human nature, but as the result of already complete individuals entering into a formal contract which it was hoped would be to the mutual advantage of the contracting parties.

So, too, the state was regarded as an artificial device designed to protect the individual from external dangers and to secure for him his preexistent natural rights. Its function was thought to be that of a passive policeman whose duty it is to stand by until called upon to guard the natural rights of the individual. The ideal form of government, most thinkers of the period concluded, was democracy—a system whereby sovereignty rests with the people, all of whom must share in the advantages of government, as well as in its responsibilities.

The economic philosophy of individualism was first stated by the physiocrats, later in classic form by

Adam Smith. It was based on the idea that natural laws exist in connection with man's social relations just as they do in connection with material objects. These laws were summed up in the central idea of *laissez-faire* economy: If all men competed vigorously with each other for their own economic welfare, and were freed from all governmental restrictions except those which protect the natural rights of life, liberty, and property, prosperity for all would result.

The underlying psychological assumptions were that men are naturally selfish; that they can therefore be depended upon to look after their own interests; and that they will work only if they are assured of a reward in some form of profit. But competition was regarded as a check on human selfishness. If allowed to function freely, competition would tend to bring on the market commodities of the highest possible quality at the lowest possible price.

Weaknesses

Under the reign of this economic theory, America grew up. Some people became fabulously rich, but the standard of living for all was raised. This was accomplished primarily by lowering the costs of production through large-scale methods, putting increased profits in the hands of the owners of the means of production; and bringing a greater number and variety of goods within the reach of more people than ever before in the history of mankind. By rewarding initiative, inventiveness, and resourcefulness, we brought about an era of unprecedented progress.

But in the course of its history the competitive system has revealed certain weaknesses.

First: Freedom of enterprise frequently meant freedom to exploit the natural resources of the country.

Second: The tendency became alarming on the part of certain persons to combine into groups which regulated production and prices contrary to the principles of *laissez-faire* economy, but often consistent with the requirements of economic efficiency.

Third: Competition has not brought about the equitable distribution of wealth that earlier theorists had envisaged.

Finally, competitive capitalism has failed to give continuous employment to large numbers of working people, thus depriving them of economic security on which so much of one's personal happiness depends.

Counterattack

All of this has led to two outstanding attempts to counteract some of the more harmful effects of our economic order. To offset the advantages that capital derives from combination, laborers and farmers have tended to organize, thereby substituting group for individual action. And the apparent inability of our economic system to bring well-being to all has led the Government to step in to regulate business, as well as carry on a number of activities formerly conducted by private enterprise.

There are those who view these tendencies with obvious alarm, seeing in them a threat to the democratic way of life. Whether or not these fears are well grounded, we must recognize certain facts in appraising both movements in terms of our democratic system of values.

Many believe that there is only one external form that political and economic democracy may assume, and that is the one current in eighteenth and nineteenth century America. As the criterion of whether an economic or political order is democratic, they use conformity to the past. A more critical analysis of the term "democratic" reveals that activities varying widely in external form may still be democratic, provided they possess the internal essence of democratic behavior.

This essence was stated for all time by Lincoln in the words "of the people, by the people, and for the people." Circumstances may force an enterprise to take on different external forms at different times. But if it remains throughout these changes an enterprise of the people, by the people, and for the people, it remains essentially democratic.

Many Forms

It is hardly necessary to say that it is fortunate for the lovers of democracy that it is not so rigid as some of its friends would make it. If it were, it would surely crack under the stress and strain of constantly changing conditions.

But if more people were aware of the fact that democracy can take on any one of many external forms, there would be less alarm at departures from former ways of doing things. If, in addition, more people knew what test to apply to the innovations going on about them, there would be more intelligent judgments as to whether or not these changes were democratic in character and more positive action to prevent undemocratic practices from taking hold.

Then, too, let us remember the distinction between formal and real liberty and equality. Many persons today share the view of eighteenth century thinkers that individuals are complete within themselves, that their enjoyment of the rights of liberty and equality depends simply upon their formal guarantee by law. But equal justice before the law, important as it is, does not in itself always secure the enjoyment of genuine liberty and equality.

Liberty, Equality

Today we realize that liberty and equality are not pre-existent absolutes that exist by themselves in a self-contained individual, but that they are functions of a total situation that has much to do with the amount of liberty and equality enjoyed by an individual. A jobless man burdened with poor health, a meager education, and many dependents enjoys one kind of liberty and equality. A person possessed of good health, steady employment, professional skill, and few dependents enjoys quite another kind of liberty and equality.

Unless, then, the larger situation is favorable, an individual may enjoy a minimum amount of genuine liberty and equality even though he is formally entitled to equal justice before the law. It follows that justice before the law must be supplemented by programs that will correct conditions preventing some people from enjoying those rights to which we believe they are entitled.

It is also a fact worth recalling that liberty for some means restraint for others. This follows from the very nature of liberty in a complex social order. For what an individual is free to do, or not to do, depends upon what other individuals are permitted to do and not to do. Thus, more

liberty at one point in the social order means less of it at another point. In fact, the system of liberties in force at any time reveals the system of controls in force at that time, just as the set of restrictions in a social order make clear the set of liberties existing in that order.

As a result, the desire for a certain set of liberties for some is at the same time a desire for a certain set of controls for others. Conversely, the demand for a particular system of controls is at the same time a demand for a particular system of liberties. In short, no proposed social change involves the issue of whether or not all liberty is on one side and all restraint on the other. Rather, it is a question of one system of liberties and restraints as opposed to another system of liberties and restraints.

Test

Remember, lastly, that sacrifice of freedom in one field by an individual may mean added liberties for him in another field. Thus less economic liberty resulting from the substitution of group action for individual action might bring more liberty of another kind. A laborer joining a union, or a farmer participating in a group program, submits to restrictions upon his individual business activities. But such cooperative action should put more money in their pockets. They will have gained increased liberty to feed and clothe their families or to educate their children. The moral test to be applied wherever restrictions are placed on an individual's activities is this: Do these restrictions create more liberty than they take away?

The question of the place of competition and cooperation in modern society can now be placed in its proper perspective. Cooperation and competition are not the things that matter. They are simply means to some more ultimate end. Call this end individual liberty or opportunity or have your own values. The type of action that serves best to promote these things is the type of action morally called for; and this, it would seem, must be determined in each particular case.

It is not possible, therefore, to make an either-or choice between competition and cooperation. Our first loyalty is not to some "ism" such as competitive individualism or cooperative collectivism, but to the values which democracy professes to serve. Competition and cooperation, in other words, are not matters of moral principle. They are matters of expediency. The boundaries between the two should be kept fluid, and shifts should be made from one to the other as conditions warrant.

If we keep alive the idea that to be democratic, a social arrangement must be one of the people, by the people, and for the people—yes, and apply that test to concrete situations as they arise—our democratic heritage will be secure.

As a weapon of war, I seriously doubt that food has an equal.

—Sherman E. Johnson

Do You Mean Family Type Farm?

by CHARLES S. HOFFMAN

MANY PERSONS who should know better do a lot of fuzzy thinking about the nature of a family-type farm. Ask farmers what they mean by *family-type farm* and each one will probably describe his own farm; their definitions will vary from descriptions of crops grown to simple statements of size of the unit operated.

The most common variation is reference to a *family-size farm*, as though there is some mystic advantage in the operation of a particular acreage, while the farmer who operates a few acres more, or a few acres less, than this amount is not blessed with these benefits.

No matter what particular size of farm unit is selected, it will be a family-size farm only in reference to the operation of a particular farm by a particular family. It follows, then, that size is less important than the characteristics of the farm unit as related to the abilities, capacities, and needs of a specific family.

WHAT IS MEANT, therefore, is not a family-*size* but a family-*type* farm. This is a farm unit that can meet the minimum needs of the family and be operated primarily by family labor. Size itself is not important. The need is to determine the type of farm, in which size is only one of many factors making up the farm unit. Because of this, farms ranging from 40 to 80 acres in one region, or 160 to 260 acres in another region, might conceivably be classed as family-type farms.

The question, "What is a family-type farm?" cannot be answered by an over-all definition. It is not so much a unit or a quantity as it is an operating relationship whereby a farm family earns a satisfactory level of living and a substantial degree of security.

The importance of family-type farms is so great that it affects the physical, economic, and social well-being not only of the individual family but of the entire Nation. The development of farm units that are below standard and fail to meet the minimum levels of living will create social and economic distress and physical suffering. The unlimited development of larger farms by fewer operators will lower the minimum levels for the remaining farm families. The way of a democracy should be one that results in the greatest good for the greatest number. This means making the land support the maximum number of farm people at levels below which no American farm family should be expected to live.

COMPETITION for farms has tended to squeeze out more and more farm operators. The urge to increase farm income more often results in an extension of the size of operations rather than an increase in the intensity of operations. The easiest way out, if income is considered too low, or if the farm is considered an "uneconomic unit," is first to look around for more land to add to the farm.

The increasing farm population in the United States, together with a

constant, or even decreasing, quantity of fertile farm land add to the danger in the short-sighted tonic of "cure by expansion."

Far-sighted efforts to eliminate or reduce distress among the farm population are inevitably drawn toward the principle of making the land support as large a population as possible without jeopardizing the minimum levels of living.

In order to make the available land resources go as far as possible, assistance to farm families ideally would be on the basis of developing family-type units. In applying this principle, it is neither possible nor desirable to divide a given area of land by a given number of farm families. The needs, capacities, and standards of each family will vary.

A flexible scale is necessary that would start with the family as the basis of measurement rather than the land. The family living budget supplies this need. In developing the budget for a family, the peculiarities of the farm unit as well as the needs and abilities of the family must be considered. If the farm unit does not come up to these minimum requirements, then *this* farm is not a family-type farm for *this* family. It is not a family-type farm if it cannot be operated primarily by family labor, or if its production is considerably above all minimum requirements and tends toward the commercial-type farm.

THE BUDGET used as a basis for measurement should include all of the major elements of family living such as food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, together with the intangible elements of recreation and social participation. FSA officials have developed in preliminary form a suggested budget for an average family of five.

This budget is a summary of detailed planning covering each item. The estimates between items that can be home produced and those which must be purchased are obtained by first determining the items needed, and of these, the items that cannot be home produced and therefore must be purchased. The over-all budget totals $800, based on home production of food and home furnishings estimated at $460 and cash expense for goods and services to be purchased estimated at $340.

With such a budget, the first test of the farm unit is whether it will supply home-produced goods in the value of $460 and also supply net cash income to meet the expected expenses of $340.

The next test would be to prepare for each general area a supplemental food budget to determine whether the farm would supply a balanced diet and whether the deficiencies could be taken care of through use of available net cash income. As an extreme example, the total food value of $450 might be produced on the farm, but if it consisted of all potatoes or tomatoes the needs of the family would not be met. Deficiencies in the quantity or selection of available items of home production can be offset somewhat by larger net cash income with which these essentials can be purchased. The principle of self-sufficiency, however, is an essential part of the concept of family-type farms. Home-use production should provide the major part of the budgeted family needs.

In developing the family-living budget, the source of the expected cash income is analyzed on the basis of sound farm-management prac-

tices, with consideration given to topography and soil fertility, markets, equipment, and the use of family labor and skills. The production of home-use goods is analyzed on the basis of sound home-management practices, on the basis of present and expected needs of the family, and plans for meeting these needs.

AN AVERAGE budget can be developed, preferably on an area basis, which will tell in each area whether or not Farm X is a family-type farm for Joe Farmer and his family. By reducing the budget estimates to a per-person basis, or to a per-family basis on items where the cost is fairly constant regardless of size of family, the budget can be applied to any family regardless of size.

In determining family-type farms, the measurements previously outlined can be applied to any specific family with respect to a specific farm.

Such an analysis should be a first order of business in the development of farm projects where it is desirable to locate the maximum number of farm families on a limited tract of land. This would apply to the relocation of farm families from defense areas or other restricted military zones. This type of analysis is just as important in the rehabilitation of disadvantaged farm families on an individual basis. In either case, the emphasis is upon human needs and abilities, a basic point in the establishment of family-type farms.

A Footnote

In one respect, Mr. Hoffman's article gives a distinctly wrong implication, namely, that a particular family must be fitted to a particular farm, or, conversely, that the farm must be one which will provide the requisite opportunities and standard of living for a given family.

The fallacy of this concept is evident when it is tested out against as long a period of time as the period of a tenant-purchase loan. Within any given 40-year period, a family of children may be born, reared, educated, and married. If a farm were a family-type farm for a particular period when the children were the right age to do lots of work, it would not be a family-type farm after the children had all left home.

Since this is true, I do not feel that a family-type farm is a farm for a particular family at a particular time. Rather, it is one that is in general a family-type farm at any and all times.

—Paul V. Maris, director, tenant purchase division, Farm Security Administration.

State Agricultural Legislation 1942

by ARTHUR B. JEBENS

DURING the first months of 1942, eight State legislatures met in regular session and nine others in special session, but by the first of May, only Louisiana, New Jersey, and Rhode Island were still writing new laws.

Among the problems that received attention in several States was the shortage of farm labor.

A State Commission on Student Labor was created in New Jersey to regulate the employment of school children in agriculture for the duration; school children over 14 years are permitted to work on farms 15 days during the academic year. Bills also were introduced in New Jersey to reduce the age limit for child labor in canneries and other industries from 18 to 16 years, but some legislators favored a bill to give the Governor power to suspend any labor law for the duration, after a petition and hearing, rather than an outright repeal of these and other safeguards of the interests of labor.

The Governor of New York was granted a discretionary power to waive any statutory hour limitation on labor. In Rhode Island the Governor may shorten the school term to release children for farm labor, and Kentucky permits employers to work employees more than 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week.

Relief recipients in Pennsylvania may now earn up to $150 a year without losing their eligibility for relief. It is hoped that this law will make it possible to tap a potential source of part-time or seasonal farm labor that probably will not be called into the armed services but has been immobilized by the penalty provisions in relief laws.

STATE legislatures also looked ahead to problems of post-war adjustments. New York adopted legislation postponing all major capital outlays and created a post-war planning fund and commission to set in motion a post-war public works program. An appropriation of $450,000 was made to this fund, including $50,000 for administrative costs.

The Rhode Island house provided a $15,000,000 public assistance reserve fund and appropriated $2,000,000 to it for 1942 and 1943, to be used for "rainy-day relief needs." A constitutional amendment was proposed to permit the legislature to create special funds for post-war jobless relief.

The New Jersey senate adopted two measures, one to create a State resources reserve fund to be built up from a portion of the receipts from the motor fuel and liquor taxes, and the second to permit cities and counties to create public works reserves from appropriations to be used after the war for capital improvements and to be invested in Government bonds until that time. A New Jersey house bill would create an emergency relief fund, from the balances in the State highway fund on December 31

of each year, to meet direct relief costs after the war.

Acceptance of Federal grants of funds and equipment during the war and 6 months after by the State or political subdivisions was approved in New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Similar legislation was vetoed by the governor in Virginia on the grounds that the specific grant of authority was unnecessary.

INTERSTATE BARRIERS to truck transportation were partly eliminated in several States. Kentucky raised the weight limit from 18,000 to 28,000 pounds on certain defense highways, and Rhode Island increased the weight limit on semitrailers from 40,000 to 46,000 pounds to conform to statutory provisions of nearby States. The New Jersey senate approved an increase from 28 to 35 feet in the length of two-axle, four-wheel trucks. A big-truck bill in Pennsylvania to suspend the penalty provision in the present law for oversized trucks, was lost during the confusion of the last day of the special session.

New York and Virginia have made statutory reductions in speed limits in cooperation with the suggested 40-mile limitation to conserve rubber and gasoline, but similar legislation was stranded in the senate in Pennsylvania.

THE SPECIAL session in Arizona disregarded the Governor's recommendation that the functions of the mineral resources department be transferred to the university, and appropriated $50,850 to the department to promote development and use of strategic war metals found in Arizona. The bill became law without the Governor's signature. Appropriations to the commissioner of agriculture of $5,000 for the control of citrus red scale and $30,000 for the eradication of grasshoppers were approved.

Also considered in Arizona were senate bills that would create a State Dairy Commission and amend the constitution to regulate the sale and mortgaging of State lands, and house bills providing for an underground water code committee, creating a State price-control director, and permitting interim zoning in military, naval, or industrial defense areas.

Kentucky's special session, which adjourned April 8, made the first successful reapportionment of house districts since 1918. The law affects approximately 50 of the 100 house districts.

Probably the most controversial item on the New Jersey legislative calendar was the repeal of the milk-control law. After weeks of delay, a house motion was passed to relieve the agriculture committee of this bill. The proposed elimination of personal property taxation was defeated, but two other tax measures received favorable action by the house. The first would permit the county tax board to increase as well as to reduce assessments in appeals from apportionments of taxes to the taxing districts, and the second changes the requirements for redemption of tax delinquent property. Bills providing State aid to local school districts and for transportation of nonpublic school pupils have become law.

IN NEW YORK an appropriation to provide cash aid to dairymen suffering a hay shortage because of the drought was vetoed by the Governor because it might "lead to a

dangerous and wholly uncontrollable future policy." Another bill that was vetoed would exempt farmers from the milk dealers' license law if they sold less than 100 quarts of milk daily on their own premises. New York also continued its participation in the Federal long-range program of flood control, but a resolution condemning the St. Lawrence Waterway was defeated in the senate after being approved in the assembly.

The last vestige of the New York real estate tax was removed by the elimination of the armory tax, and both houses approved a resolution creating a committee to devise methods to further reduce the real estate tax burden. The senate defeated a constitutional amendment which would require compulsory budgeting of full State financial aid to local governmental units.

Living With Nature

by EARL H. BELL

IF WE ARE to establish a stationary population on the Great Plains, we must replace cultural patterns of humid regions, in which our civilization developed, with a new culture that harmonizes with the physical environment of the Plains.

That is what the moving finger of ecology writes—ecology being, briefly, the relationship between an organism and its environment. In the study of human ecology we first begin to recognize the extent to which we have created our own surroundings by paving highways, damming streams, building blast furnaces, scarring the countryside with railways, building gaunt grain elevators, and planting grain and groves of trees.

To the biologist, environment may be summed up as geography—topography, soil, drainage, altitude, humidity, rainfall, temperature, light, physical environment.

Man's environment, more complex, includes all that, plus his technological inventions and a whole subjective world of beliefs, values, institutions, and customs that the anthropologist lumps together and calls "culture."

Culture is a three-way force in human ecology. In its most simple manifestation it places additional material elements in the physical environment that changes man's adjustments. Railroads, for example, altered the density of population and the location of towns, previously determined by navigable streams. Now paved highways affect the population pattern; perhaps trucks and tractors and airplanes will completely rearrange the distributional pattern of the Plains farm population.

CULTURE modifies physical environment. With irrigation, man has made deserts bloom. With drainage he has made swamps into gardens. He has denuded forest lands. With the plow and the tractor he has changed grazing lands of the Plains into both wheat fields and dust bowls. Culture builds and destroys;

in itself it is neither moral nor immoral. Intelligence determines to which end it is used.

Culture also involves man's interpretation of physical environment. That is, one tends to see his physical surroundings from the viewpoint of his culture: The herder saw on the Great Plains an entirely different mode of life than did the farmer. The fight between Great Plains farmers and cattlemen was really a culture conflict between different beliefs and values.

Congress recognized the farmers' values and enacted Homestead Laws, which imposed the agricultural pattern of life of the Plains despite the hostility of the physical environment to such organization. But the influence of culture did not end there. Farmers from the East brought crops and cultural techniques that had been developed for Eastern soils. Even the harm thus caused to the land and many crop failures were slow in forcing a readjustment of cultural values.

As we traveled through the Dust Bowl, a farmer pointed to a barren field of shifting sand.

"I have seen that field raise 40 bushels of wheat to the acre," he said. "It would be a shame to put that good farm land into pasture. All you need to do is put it into cane until you get it held down and when rain comes again it will be all right."

The point here is that that farmer's cultural values and beliefs brought in from another area are as dominant a part of his environment as the physical surroundings.

THE ARCHAEOLOGY of the Great Plains indicates that the culture, population, and human ecology were not static. Even the climate during the past 15,000 or 20,000 years has fluctuated sufficiently to be reflected in the natural vegetation, fauna, and land forms.

The first evidence of man in the Plains is found in the remnants of old terraces, most of them along small streams. There we find evidence of the hunting activities of the earliest man in the bones of elephants, camels, American horses, musk oxen, and bison, that had become extinct long before the white man reached this continent. During the time of the residence of these people, the climate was much colder and more moist.

A later occupation period is represented by what is called the Woodland culture, so named because it was originally believed to be limited to the Woodland area of the East. In recent years we have found, however, that it extends from the Atlantic Coast through the wooded regions, across northern Nebraska, and well into Wyoming and Colorado. The village sites are nearly always in old terraces beneath the present surface. The presence of pottery, however, indicates that the culture is probably younger than that discussed above.

There is little evidence of agriculture, and that during the late period of their occupation, and it seems that these people were almost entirely dependent upon small game for their livelihood. The relative sparseness of the settlements and small size of the groups indicated by the size of the sites are a direct ecological response to environment.

The next culture horizon seems to have been brought in by a round-headed people from the Southeast. These people introduced agriculture on a relatively large scale. They planted gardens on the low, moist

terraces, and hunted on the nearby tablelands. After a decade or so, they used to move to a new location.

SUCH an ecological adjustment—that is, using the valleys, many of them subirrigated, and reserving the highlands for grazing—is probably the best adaptation ever made to the Plains environment. It combined agriculture and cattle. Under aboriginal conditions, Nature could reduce the herds and adjust them to the available grass resources; problems of overgrazing were not so acute. Our own culture places a higher value upon cattle than upon the range resources, thus reversing natural balances.

Even despite the fine ecological adjustment, there are evidences of great calamities. We find in northern Nebraska, along the Ponca Creek valley, remains that are completely covered with from 2 to 15 feet of sand. With the natural subirrigation of the valley, people could live there for a considerable time although sand was blowing and destroying the buffalo pasture.

When I first saw the Dust Bowl, I was struck by the close resemblance that must exist between the village site in northern Nebraska centuries ago and that Dust Bowl in Colorado today: A peaceful agricultural people prospered until a series of dry years came and destroyed vegetation and allowed sand to drift and form dunes over their villages. Finally, they abandoned their homes to the sand.

The next stream of people into the region were the ancestors of the tribes that were here at the arrival of the white man—the Ponca, Omaha, Oto, Pawnee.

These also were primarily agriculturalists. At first, they did not have horses, but they probably were fully horsed by the middle of the eighteenth century. In that period a great change came in the culture of the Plains. The people placed less emphasis on agriculture and more on hunting.

THE HORSE was a technological development that solved the problem of transportation and permitted them to exploit the greatest natural resource of the Plains—the buffalo. After the horse had been introduced, the last prewhite stream of culture entered the region in the Sioux.

These people had been living in western Wisconsin, to the east of what then were the Chippewa; to the east of the Chippewa was the white man. The Chippewa got guns from the white man and chased out the Sioux, who crossed southern Minnesota and northern Iowa, pushed out into the Plains, and began to impinge on the homeland of the Ponca, Omaha, and Pawnee. The Sioux multiplied and menaced the agricultural people. So when the white man came in, the village type joined up with the white man in an unsuccessful attempt to drive out the Sioux.

That completes the cultural and ecological history of the Plains for more than 15,000 years.

THERE IS a valuable lesson in the adjustment of these people. The most constant thing about the Plains environment is the fluctuation of rainfall. There are minor fluctuations, like the droughts of historic times, the effects of which may be minimized by the proper ecological adjustments. And there are fluctuations so serious that their repetition

may bring a complete collapse of Plains society as we know it.

Rainfall in the Great Plains is spotty. In one year, some areas will be subhumid, some semiarid, and some desertlike. The Plains Indians (and until recently the natives of great grassland areas throughout the world) have been seminomadic. Without a sedentary cultural tradition, the people have moved from the dry areas to the more moist ones. It is only in the last century and a half that mankind has attempted to establish a sedentary population upon the world's great grasslands, all of which are characterized by a violently fluctuating rainfall.

To date, we have been equally successful in all of the continents. The famines of which we have read year after year in the wheat belts of Russia are crop failures due to lack of sufficient moisture in a country without the humanitarian patterns of the United States. Attempts to settle the Plajns permanently can be successful if we work in harmony with physical environment.

Books

THE HISTORY OF LAND USE IN THE HARVARD FOREST. *Hugh M. Raup* and *Reynold E. Carlson*. Harvard University. Petersham, Mass. Harvard Forest Bulletin No. 20. 64 pages.

by VIRGIL L. HURLBURT

THE STUDY from which this report resulted was undertaken to trace the progress of the use of land and to characterize the pre-Colonial forest. The need for such data and the possibilities of their application in present and future forest land management in New England is self-evident.

The authors are to be commended on the task completed, particularly in view of the difficulties presented by the host of complicated interrelationships within any history of land use as such, and the relative dearth of exact and detailed information from which data could be drawn. Data from a variety of sources, original and secondary, covering a number of disciplines have been brought together carefully. The utilization of information in deed registeries and town records, and the careful analysis of land titles suggest that researchers in other social science fields may examine this source of historical data to good advantage.

THE CHAPTERS on introduction, previous work, methodology, history of land divisions, and growth of population are brief and to the point, but stand out a little too much as chapters. Had these been worked into the manuscript as subexplanation, showing more of the relation-

ship between population growth, industrial development, and types of land use, the report would have been strengthened. In this respect, the book follows the organizational pattern of the bulk of published bulletins—namely, presentation by subject matter titles with space devoted to soils, climate, population, and the like, rather than by characterization of the pattern of use and the use of those subject breakdowns to explain the pattern.

The chapter on history of agriculture is slightly overburdened with statistics that add little to the explanation, but this fault is far outweighed by excellent summary paragraphs concerning the conclusions to be drawn from these data.

The chapter on forest history covers both history of use and the composition and distribution of pre-Colonial forests. The method of presentation, involving rather detailed handling of three separate sample tracts, will be useful to those familiar with the area, but seems unnecessarily detailed for the nonresident reader. The detail offers proof that the analysis was thoroughgoing, but the 10 pages of text and the 6 maps do not contribute explanation in proportion to space used.

The reader is presented with the pertinent facts in the authors' summary sentences:

"Upland forest successions in Petersham may be summarized in two categories. The first, which has been discussed at some length in the preceding pages, occurred in tracts that were never cleared for pasture or cultivation. The similarity between the present timber on these tracts, both in composition and local distribution, and that of the pre-Colonial upland forest as outlined for Petersham in general, indicates that no serious changes have occurred since the first settlement. Perhaps the most important was the recent elimination of the chestnut by disease. Repeated cutting and occasional burning no doubt set up minor variations, and the smaller size of the trees changed the general aspect, but the composition of the forest must have remained fairly constant."

THE SECTIONS on succession in the Petersham Forests, and summary and conclusions are especially well done.

The findings are contributions to management practices for the future in that foresters are provided with substantiated guiding principles.

"First, relic wood lots may be used with a reasonable degree of accuracy to determine present-day timber-growing potentials in terms of natural or primeval forest conditions. Second, these wood lots may be used as a scale against which to plot the probable results of future development in old field forests. Third, the results of the whole investigation strongly suggest that the basic arrangement of natural forest types, in comparison with the existing ones, is relatively simple, and that the bewildering complexity of the present mosaic of types is very largely due to the differential consequences of land use and abandonment."

THE STUDY rounds out a segment of knowledge. Portions of its procedure will need to be repeated again and again, throughout the Nation, but one can question seriously the advisability of repeating elsewhere in detail the procedure for analysis of presettlement forests.

Instead, it would seem preferable

and expeditious that silvicultural research concentrate on studying existing stands, taking into account what is known about the ravages of time, disease, hurricane, and the differential consequences of use. These should indicate enough about adapted species and necessary practices without exploring too far the intricacies of ecology.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION, 1917–1919. *William Clinton Mullendore.* With an introduction by Herbert Hoover and a foreword and bibliography by Ralph Haswell Lutz. (Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace Publication 18.) Stanford University Press. Stanford University, Calif. 399 pages.

by EVERETT E. EDWARDS

THE HISTORY of this volume explains its nature and contents. The author was an assistant counsel in the legal division of the United States Food Administration, and his text as here presented was completed in 1921. The 43-page introduction by Herbert Hoover was written in 1920. Copies of these manuscripts have been available in the Hoover Library on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University and in the National Archives. With the advent of the present world conflict, the food problem once more became crucial. To assist in its delineation, the Hoover Library has resurrected the two reports and published them without changes as "the official history of the Food Administration."

Mullendore's original text included an appendix, consisting of the regulatory orders of the agency. These, and likewise certain of the price tables, were omitted. The only addition is a foreword by Prof. Ralph H. Lutz, which includes a two-page bibliography of works relating to the activities of the Food Administration.

Mullendore's report provides the only comprehensive summary of the work of the Food Administration and the problems which it had to meet.

The first four chapters are concerned with the conditions affecting the food situation in the United States in 1917; the formulation of the program, the problems, powers, and organization, and the interrelationships with the work of the other Government departments. The fifth chapter summarizes the ways and means of effecting the conservation of foods. The next four chapters consider wheat, flour, and bread. The problems incident to sugar are the subject of chapter 10. The three following chapters delineate the licensing of trades and commodities and the regulation of wholesalers and retailers.

There are also chapters devoted to perishable commodities, cold storage, meat packing, hog production, the canning industry, cottonseed and cottonseed products, the "coarse grains" (corn, oats, rye, and barley) and their products, rice, dried fruits, beans, coffee, and collateral commodities (ice, twine, and so on).

The last nine chapters concern the movement in food prices, the coordination of purchases, the activities of the grain corporation, transportation

problems, and the Food Administration's expenditures. The appendixes provide lists of the agency's personnel.

THE AUTHOR has avoided most of the faults that usually inhere in official histories. There are no extended pleas for controversial decisions and policies. On the other hand, there is very little interpretation, and the value for administrative purposes in the present crisis is subject to question.

Although the treatment in each chapter is chronological, little attention is given to the reasons why the Food Administration had to change its various policies from time to time. In other words, the motivating forces at work are not delineated.

PERHAPS it is impossible to write histories that include adequate consideration of administrative procedures by following the traditional processes of historical research. Probably we must place trained historians in the agencies and charge them with the responsibility of compiling the data that are needed for the comprehension of the motivations in governmental action. In this generation, the basic reasons for official decisions are often developed in telephone conversations and small informal conferences of key individuals, and these are seldom written down and filed in the archives of the agency. Admitted that data on such procedures is frequently highly confidential, administrative analysts and historians must evolve ways and means of recording this information and holding it in trust for the research workers of the next generation.

OLD MCDONALD HAD A FARM. *Angus McDonald*. Boston. Houghton Mifflin Company. 278 pages.

by A. D. STEFFERUD

OLD James Angus McDonald believed in salvation first and solvency second. He was quite a character. This book about him by his son is quite a book.

When he was 18, the old man was out plowing one day and the Lord spoke to him and told him to go to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ. He went to Cooper's Institute in Mississippi, working, preaching, and farming. Then to Lebanon, Tenn., where he got a degree, a wife, and two children before he was 29. From then on he served the Lord, living in towns and cities, preaching the Gospel and saving souls. But he always wanted to get back to the farm. He read about better farming methods, looked at farm land, and talked about getting back to it as if he just left it.

There is a lovely consistency about the old man's salvation and solvency. The McDonalds were farmers and Presbyterian preachers—Calvinistic, stern, intolerant, but poor. James Angus learned young what poverty means; he was 10 when his father went to the Civil War; it was up to him to support his mother and the five children and to take care of them when she died at the end of the war.

He saw the poverty of his parish-

ioners, and his sermons blended tirades against cotton farming and the devil.

"This is God's earth and you are desecrating his work when you plow up and down the hill and let the water wash away the soil that the Lord has put there for our use," he thundered.

"A lot of you people have got the idea that you can come here on Sunday and look pious and act pious and everything is fine. Everything is wonderful, you think. I went to church. I discharged my duty and I can go home and let my land go to rack and ruin. I can let my family starve. I can let my wife do the work. And let me tell you right now, the Lord loves and appreciates the good women of this community. The good women, I say, who look after the crops and milk the cow, while you trifling men are off drunk when you ought to be in the field * * *

"You are too abominably lazy to work and take care of your crops and your families. You have no right to abuse God's earth, and you have got no right to neglect your wife and children * * *

"I rode almost to Dwight and I took a big circle around Badger, and I looked at all the farms along the way, and I did not see a cow or a pig or the sign of a garden anywhere. What kind of farming is this? What kind of treatment are you giving your families and God's earth by raising nothing but cotton? Well, you can't eat cotton! 'Oh, yes,' you say, 'but I've got to raise cotton to get money.' And what do you do with your money? You go to town to buy stuff you should raise on the farm. You live out of a paper sack and you don't live half as well as you would if you raised feed crops, a garden, and livestock . . . Let us pray!"

HE PRACTICED what he preached.

That is the main story of the book, and much of it is of the kind that makes your heart warm—a success story, a struggle against elements and scoffers and rocky soil. The part that does not do that is the end, and it makes you wonder, and gives you a queer taste.

The old man was 61 when he finally went back to the farm—a gullied, impoverished, stony piece of space on a hilltop near Sallisaw, Okla. Everybody tried to discourage him; bankers made loans on cotton, not for subsistence farming; Mrs. McDonald was town-bred; the boys were apprehensive about the work; the old man had no money. But he got Doc Kelleam's place, a "rock and air" farm, whose main characteristic was disorder, and he vowed that "you won't know this place in a year."

There was the inevitable struggle, crop failures, and slavish work for the old man, Mrs. McDonald, and their two boys and daughter—five older children by his first wife were out in the world, doing well. The old man got churches near the farm; that helped. Droughts, doubts, gullies were conquered; the old man never questioned himself or his decisions.

"The foundation of a good farm is livestock and feed crops. The manure will enrich the land and you can eat the pigs and chickens, and raise a garden that will keep your table supplied with fresh vegetables."

He had terrific strength and a ter-

rific will. He got rich off his land, while neighbors and parishioners failed, and before long he was buying adjoining land, at bargain prices. He repaired the damage of erosion and neglect. He had many ideas about farming, strange in that region, and they always worked—terracing, cover crops, green manure, rotations.

"One reason the old man's ideas didn't go over so well was that it took so much work to put them in practice. The neighbors thought it was foolish to pull fodder. It was a lot of trouble. We had to pull it in the hottest weather and tie it in hands, and then about dusk when the dew had begun to fall, go out and tie four hands into one bundle. If you tied it before dusk the blades were so brittle that they would tear all to pieces."

WHEN A NEIGHBOR told him, "You shore do like work—you can get hay a lot easier than that," the old man's rejoinder should have cut deep: "Cassidy, I heard you been buying some hay. I have never bought a bale of hay and I never expect to."

But: That night at supper the old man was beaming. "Well, boys, I just bought the Cassidy ten."

One day he announced that he wanted to have a big family reunion. He finally agreed to have the house papered because Mrs. McDonald was "really ashamed for the older children to see these bare walls." He had the house painted every 2 years because that would keep it from rotting, but "what difference does the inside make—the house keeps us warm on the cold winter nights; that's the main thing." Butter-and-egg money that his wife had saved for new furniture went for the interior decoration; but McDonald used some of his for a new sleeping porch.

So the children came for a reunion of eating, picnicking, talk, and proudful glances from their father. A good family; the salt of the earth, those McDonalds; strong, fertile, healthy, and sound of mind and limb. Monument enough for any man; the old man was pleased that they turned out well, but his farm was his monument.

THAT REUNION is a turning point of the book. After that, respect and admiration for the old man somehow change. The change is not due to the telling. Angus McDonald has done a masterful job; his book is readable, sharply done, and workmanlike. It is a plea for better farming without being a book of special pleading. But the orange is squeezed in the final one-fourth. You ask, to what good was all this toil and the drudgery inflicted on the family? There is irony, maybe tragedy, in the conclusion.

The family is trying to persuade the father to install a bathroom:

" 'Nonsense, boy,' said the old man. 'We don't need those modern gadgets. The good Lord never intended all these modern contraptions. The old privy is good enough for me. Of course, on these cold mornings the cold seat is a little bit of a shock to our setters, but that's not the true pioneer spirit. Have you children got so tender and rich that you can't stand a little cold? The good Lord never intended for our setters to be so well protected.' "

The old man went on in that vein. The Lord invariably was on his side of the argument. And he always

stated his case with such finality and such conviction that it would seem like the rankest heresy to disagree . . .

The old man turned and looked at me like he was seeing me for the first time. He hesitated a long time before he spoke.

"'How old are you, boy?' he asked.

"'Sixteen.'

"'I thought so,' he said, as if he had just made a great discovery, and still looked at me as if he were seeing me for the first time. 'Well, I declare, you boys are growing up. I've been so busy that I hadn't noticed.'"

AS COUSIN JIM'S car took him to the hospital where he died, he had his last sermon: "These cars are bankrupting the country. Look at these farmers' places. Half the window lights out, the fences down, and not a cow or chicken in the place, but a car sitting in the yard." He fell back in the seat. "I'm an old man. I am done." And a moment later: "I've never been beaten, never been beaten."

No, he was not beaten. He was a good and great man; he had not lost his soul, but what had he gained? Angus, whom the father did not know, left the farm in 1922; 10 years of it were enough for him.

JOHN S. WRIGHT: PROPHET OF THE PRAIRIES. *Lloyd Lewis.* The Prairie Farmer Publishing Co. Chicago. 215 pages.

by DEWITT C. WING

LLOYD LEWIS' biography of John S. Wright is a spirited, forthright revealment of a remarkable youth who flowered into manhood in a place and time that published human nature in bold-faced type.

Exposed to rough disciplines and the pecuniary opportunities of pioneer settlers, Wright was forced to make compromises and adaptations, but he never lost an inner light that guided his behavior. It is fitting that his biographer should be a Midwesterner; Lewis was born and reared on an Indiana farm in a Quaker neighborhood; he began his writing career in Chicago; he learned to write by writing about people in action.

Wright founded *The Prairie Farmer* in Chicago a little more than 100 years ago. It is one of the oldest American farm journals and is robustly alive. Wright was 17 years old on October 28, 1832 when with his father, "Deacon" Wright, he stood at the rail of a lake schooner as it came in from Lake Michigan to anchor near the mouth of the Chicago River. As the Deacon saw it then, Chicago was a squalid sight. It had changed but little since his first casual visit there in 1815. He and his son were headed for Galena (commonly referred to then as the future metropolis of the West), on the Mississippi River 200 miles to the northwest.

Wright and his boy were irked by their enforced stop in Chicago for weeks before starting for Galena. A mistake had been made in shipping merchandise they were bringing to sell. Only a part of it had come with them on the schooner; the rest had missed the boat at Buffalo. It would come on the next schooner. Three weeks earlier, they had left home at Williamstown, Mass. They rode the first few miles behind a primitive locomotive, then a long stretch on one of the creaking arks on the Erie Canal, and finally the lake schooner trip from Buffalo to Chicago.

BETWEEN CLUMPS of scrub oaks that lined the sand dunes along the shores of Lake Michigan, young Wright glimpsed the prairie wilderness that was to be the theater of his mercantile, real estate, and the other activities out of which grew his interest in establishing a farm journal. He was inwardly resolved to be a successful salesman of "Yankee notions."

From sailors, the boy learned that it was prairie fires that made the land bare. Indians started fires in the spring to burn off the dead grass and hasten the tender green shoots their ponies liked. In the fall, the Indians spread fires to corner their game.

Inquiring as to which of the Chicago taverns might be least offensive, the Deacon was directed to one on the opposite side of the South Branch of the meandering river. A ferry would be there to take them over. When their wagon creaked up the river, no ferry was in sight. They waited. Soon there approached a large and effusive Frenchman who inquired, "You going to stop here?"

"Yes," said Deacon Wright, "we heard that the hotel was on the other side."

Pointing to a log house standing near at hand and on their side of the river, the Frenchman said, "This is my house." Wright and his son moved in, but the father soon bought a horse and struck off inland, exploring. Immigration was trickling into the Fox River Valley out to the northwest on the way to Galena.

Scarcely had the father disappeared when the son was all over the post, inspecting the contents of the log stores, noting what merchandise was selling and at what prices, studying travelers, and finding out what made them come to Chicago. Waiving the fact that, as a minor, he had no legal authority to make contracts or transact business, the young man rented a vacant log cabin and, unpacking his father's boxes, opened a store.

With Philo Carpenter, a young Easterner, the Deacon's son went out into the prairie west of the settlement and held the chain while a surveyor measured off for them a quartersection of land apiece.

TAKING IT in his father's name, the Wright boy guaranteed to pay the preemption price of $1.25 an acre. To thrifty Yankees, toughened by scrabbling with little stony fields in New England, the "congress land" of the Far West at $1.25 an acre seemed a bargain indeed at a time when the spirit of emigration was fermenting all along the Atlantic Seaboard.

Older inhabitants said this was "crazy speculation." Elsewhere in the 25 States of the Union in November 1832, crowds were cheering

the victory of Andrew Jackson over Henry Clay in the presidential elections, or quarreling over the attempts of South Carolinians to declare the Federal tariff law null and void.

AT THE trading post of Chicago the talk was of pelts, grog, and wolf hunts. A few citizens had half-heartedly surveyed the village, but nothing more had been done. Young Wright had seen, as his father had not, that here was the place for a great city. Land was so rich and cheap that the prairie must soon be filled with farmers. If fur traders of the Northwest brought their pelts to Chicago, then farmers must do the same. Within a few weeks, Wright's father came riding back into town. On his trip he, too, had seen that Chicago, not the Fox River Valley or Galena, was the place for them to locate. Wright, the youth, was beginning to lead and to be liked.

At 10, John Wright was a prodigy. He was far enough along at Williams College to recite Greek. Mark Hopkins said that Wright's was one of the brightest minds ever to come under his instruction. One of six children and the oldest, he was 7 when his mother had felt herself unequipped further to educate him. At 12 the boy was studying algebra, Greek, Latin, and Euclid in an academy.

The Deacon returned to his wife and his other children late in 1832. He was enthusiastic about his new location, Chicago. The mother wondered about her son "out there." She couldn't be sure that he was finding and busying himself in a manner worthy of his gifts.

WHEN the original stock of merchandise brought in by the Deacon had run out, the boy had begun trading in firearms. He soon became a crack marksman, but continued to attend religious services, which the commander of the garrison held at the fort on Sundays. In the summer of 1832, Chief Black Hawk had started a revolt which sent the scattering white settlers hurrying to the nearest blockhouses. Black Hawk was overthrown in August, and it was now safe for homeseekers to traverse the great sea of grass and select claims which could be entered as soon as a promised treaty with the Indians could be made.

In February 1833, young Wright helped raise the third frame building in the hamlet. The winter was passing. Wild geese began to drop down from the North and rest inside the sand bar outside the river's mouth. Deacon Wright had returned to Chicago from Massachusetts, intending to buy as much land as he could; he greeted his son, exchanged news and then looked around. His jaw dropped. Those guns! Nothing but guns, and ramrods, and powder horns. Had the son turned into a sporting character? Saying nothing, the Deacon went across town to that first of the merchants, George W. Dole, and asked had his son been behaving.

"Never you fear for John," said Dole. "The boys have tried their best to get him into our frolics, but he was no go."

DEACON WRIGHT and his son had their hands in the organization of the first attempt to educate the children of the post. Most of the children were French and Indian. Land was bought from Indians for 3 cents an acre and sold next day to whites for "100 per squire."

On his twentieth birthday, July 15, 1835, Wright balanced his books. He had $1,225 in the bank, debts of $9,511, and real estate worth approximately $90,000. At business he was as much of a prodigy as at Greek. A financial panic broke out and spread in 1837. In May of that year a sign hung over the door of a Water Street office in Chicago reading: "John S. Wright; Storage, Forwarding, and Commission."

A few men with ideas similar to Wright's met and decided in 1838 to organize a society for the betterment of schools and for the organization of progressive farmers. Later that year, he and these men met and organized such a body.

In January 1839, a delegation, headed by Wright as spokesman, journeyed to the State Capital at Vandalia, to ask the legislature to charter the Union Agricultural Society "for the sole purpose of instruction in science and improvements in scientific and practical agriculture and the mechanical arts in the counties of LaSalle, Will, Cook, McHenry, and Kane."

An act of incorporation was passed February 19. Wright was one of 50 trustees, and also one of the 10 commissioners empowered to sell $10,000 of stock in the nonprofit corporation. And so, at 23, he was bidding farewell to the career of a money-eyed man and embarking upon public service.

WRIGHT FOUND the times still too hard for selling stock in a philanthropic corporation. It was some time before the trustees could be brought together to elect officers. When they met at Joliet, Wright was elected secretary. He told the trustees that a newspaper was necessary to the establishment of the society, and that a farm paper could awaken readers to needs which the general papers did not touch. "Wright was always a compelling salesman."

He led the trustees to appoint a committee, with him as chairman, to investigate possibilities and report later in the summer. When he reported he "showed that the thing could be done." Agreeing, the trustees appropriated $100 and asked him to serve as editor, offering him "in lieu of a salary" whatever he could make out of 1,000 subscribers, a sum estimated by him to be some $300 a year, "if all went well." Above that the profits were to go to enlarging the paper.

Here was a man of 25, who had never worked a day on a farm, becoming the chief organizer of an agricultural society, and, although he had never written a line for publication, taking on the job of reporter, editor, and publisher of an agricultural monthly.

When Wright set himself to his new task, his own bankruptcy had to be adjusted. In October 1840, the first number of *The Union Agriculturist* appeared. Its most controversial article was on schools instead of agriculture. Wright advocated many school reforms. His was the first definite proposal for a State Normal School in Illinois.

By January 1841, his paper had a circulation of 2,000 copies at $1 a year, and its title was *The Union Agriculturist and The Prairie Farmer*. Wright wrote in this issue that small, diversified farms would be more profitable than careless beef-growing; but he contended that stockraising would always be important on the prairies.

He advocated the planting of Osage orange to make "a poor man's fence." What helped the paper to weather the storm in its first year was the young editor's willingness to confess his faults and blunders in print. He took his readers into his confidence about the paper's finances and troubles.

AS WRIGHT, entering his forties, reached the fullness of his powers, he was driven by two motives: To make money for himself and his family, and to serve and protect the public. In September 1846, he married Kitty Turner, the red-haired, adopted daughter of George and Martha Washington.

In 1844, *The Prairie Farmer* said that "the rush of sheep to Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Missouri is a perfect tornado. The demand is so great in Ohio that prices have risen 100 percent in a few weeks."

When the paper's advertising fell from 10 columns in January 1856, to one column in September 1857, Wright gave up and handed the paper over to his printers. The panic of 1837 had brought him the paper; the panic of 1857 was taking it away. In 1856 his real estate was valued at more than $600,000. Another panic was on the country when, in 1874, Wright's family placed him in a Philadelphia asylum where he died.

His services in behalf of better and more schools, and his passion for higher education lower down had far-reaching consequences in his circulation territory and beyond. He bore a torch that still sheds light through the farm paper that he founded, and, now, in a competent writer's story of his life.

Letters

SIR:

I have read with interest the article by Messrs. Hammer and Buck in your April issue. I was brought up on a small, low-income farm and have every sympathy with efforts to improve the income of such people; however, I believe the position taken by these authors is fundamentally unsound as a wartime policy.

Looking back, I am sure that my people worked hard in the last war and probably increased somewhat the production of our small farm; however, their increase must have been very meager in comparison with the increases accomplished on nearby larger farms operated by an uncle and a cousin.

It is a matter of arithmetic that the percentage increases on small farms add up to less than increases on large farms. The point of view that the larger commercial farms are operating up to capacity may have some theoretical foundation, but it has no basis in fact.

I am enclosing a copy of a recent issue of our *Illinois Farm Economics* which shows increases in livestock production on the farm-account-keeping farms in Illinois. For the most part, these are large commercial farms. The figures indicate that there was plenty of slack in the organization of these farms to permit increases in production. We have made a detailed

study of the increases in milk production by farmers in different tenure and debt positions in a typical dairy county in this State, and find that all groups increased milk output except the owners with less than 20 cows who were either out of debt or had high debts. All groups of tenants, regardless of number of cows or debt ratio, increased production.

At the present time, farm communities in this area have practically been cleaned out of single men eligible for military service. This condition has just been reached. It is my understanding that overall manpower plans call for taking some 600,000 workers out of agriculture during 1942. Certainly any program for recruiting this manpower which has in mind the realities of food production will leave enough men in the areas where land resources permit efficient use of manpower per worker to operate the farms.

If it comes to a showdown for manpower, it seems to me that necessity will require heavier drafts on the areas where agricultural labor is used less efficiently. Personally I believe that any efforts to block this adjustment is opposed to vital national interests. It is my impression that the more mobile elements of manpower in the low-income farm areas instinctively recognize this as well as the present economic advantages which may be realized by doing something else rather than working with meager resources in a time of national emergency For example, there is one farm not far from Urbana which, to all outward appearances, has a meager opportunity for income but has five men in the armed forces.

—L. J. Norton,
Professor of Agricultural Economics,
University of Illinois,
Urbana.

SIR:

In the April issue of the Land Policy Review, David L. MacFarlane insists that economics must be devoid of social ethics. For Mr. MacFarlane, the economist's field is restricted to a description of what is (or what would be, under assumptions), and thus the scientist's contribution to social planning is limited. As an economist, he must not expand his field to an explanation of what should be. That field, he says, is for the social philosopher and others.

If Mr. MacFarlane means that economists should recognize that noneconomic considerations must be taken into account, as well as economic, in reaching decisions on social policies, and that others besides the economists must participate in the decisions, no one will question his argument. If he means, however, that economists should be concerned solely with the application of methodology, one may take issue with his position.

The content of economic theory cannot be thought of as an entity in a vacuum. Economists should be the first to understand that the postulates, principles, and theories of their science have their roots in a social philosophy. Thus, the tools of economists are shaped by social environment and are indeed part and parcel of a social philosophy and a social ethics of a given time. When economists use these tools, they tacitly accept or acquiesce to the philosophy associated with their particular brands of science. The really important thing for economists to guard against is to see that they do not use outmoded tools unsuitable to present needs.

The social philosophy which economists accept constitutes an important influence on their statements of social problems and on their findings. Two economists applying theories derived from different types of social philosophy will describe the same social problem differently, and will come out, through their analyses, with unlike conclusions. Both may argue that they have restricted themselves to a description and have excluded ethical considerations.

The reason for their different conclusions consists in the fact that they have as economists embraced different social philosophies.

And this is how things should be, for then means are available for the exploitation of imagination and for subsequent reasoning justifying serious consideration of scientific conclusions. Humanistic sciences are necessarily dynamic in methods as well as in postulates and principles. Social philosophy and the body of economic thought growing out of it should change in harmony with changes in real life. That is the real hope of economists and of those who depend on their help.

The limits of economists' contribution to planning can be determined by testing the applicability of the social philosophy upon which their theories and their conclusions rest. Economists as well as others participating in policy formation should make this test.

—Walter M. Rudolph,
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Washington, D. C.

SIR:

I have a very definite suggestion to make: Suspend publication at once. In this locality the Boy Scouts are gathering up discarded soap wrappers, paper bags, old newspapers, and magazines. We are told to aid in the prosecution of the war. If all such papers were gathered up daily in all the States and shipped to Washington, it is very doubtful if enough material would be available from this source to furnish paper for printing the numerous pamphlets, bulletins, and other mimeographed memoranda emanating from Washington Bureaus. If there is a real paper shortage or a threatened one, it will be due primarily to the publication of bureaucratic bulletins rather than to the normal and reasonable use of paper by the average citizen.

—F. G.,
Boise, Idaho.

FROM THE MAILBAG:

From a supervisor of agriculture in a Pennsylvania township high school: "Land Policy Review has priority over many other magazines in our library because it is edited to the level of rural people, the topics discussed are seasonal and timely, and it keeps one informed about rural and agricultural progress nationally."

A professor of agricultural economics: "It is a first-rate publication, serving to acquaint careful thinkers with developments in land policy in various growing parts of our far-flung U. S. A. It is stimulating."

A county agent: "Land Policy Review has in it timely information on agricultural subjects that I have been able to use in a very fine way with the constituents whom I serve. This information can be used over radio, localized for newspapers, and informal group meetings and discussions."

An assistant statistician: "Your magazine is helping to project into many minds a realization of the greatness of democracy as a form of life, not just a word, and may move some to work for the realization of democratic ideals."

An official in the State Department: "Land Policy Review is one of the most useful, interesting, and attractive publications issued in this field by the Government. Its special value is as a vehicle of considered, expert opinion, rather than of factual data, but there are enough of the latter to fortify its conclusions."

An FSA worker: "Land Policy Review is essential to the war effort and to the post-war effort."

An experiment station administrator: "My grasp of the complexities facing American agriculture has been measurably strengthened, I believe, through reading the articles from month to month."

For Your Attention

For a Better Post-War Agriculture. National Planning Association, 800 Twenty-First St., NW., Washington, D. C. 48 pages. 25 cents.

This attractive, readable booklet, number 11 in the excellent *Planning Pamphlets* series, is based to some extent on materials developed by post-war planning committees. Its scope mostly is limited to the definite, quantitatively measured rural works projects that can ease any unemployment after the war and help build up agricultural America. But whether it aims to be so or not, it is a good, fairly complete outline of things to be done.

It is without doubt a benchmark in post-war planning—not that it is the last word, but rather that it is something of a first word in a field in which many have been talking, thinking, and working, but from which remarkably little that is workable and precise has come. All workers in agriculture should find it of interest and value; some will find it a quite comprehensive program; others will find much food for thought in it.

The booklet devotes major attention to improving our forests, range lands, pastures, and rural housing. Liberal space is given to nutrition, medical care, community life, education, libraries, and leases and tenure An introductory section points out a need for confidence and knowledge in post-war planning, and declares that before we can plan we need to have a better idea of what we should plan for—what kind of farm plant we want in the better United States we want.

Some people, of course, will be quick to note certain omissions or scant mention of a number of important projects—rural roads, cooperatives, and decentralization of industry, to name three. But some of the topics that might have been in this publication were considered in *Urban Redevelopment and Housing* (*Planning Pamphlet* No. 10) and *Guides for Post-War Planning* (No. 8). Both of them, incidentally, deserve wide attention.

Besides its precise proposals and its plea that something be done to save our soil and forests, *For a Better Post-War Agriculture* is to be commended for its tone, its flavor, which, briefly, is that we must cease exploitation, take care of the many good things we have, and work confidently and wisely toward a goal of a permanently well-adjusted agriculture.

The Economic Implications of the Central Valley Project. Walter E. Packard. Adcraft, 3440 South Hope Street, Los Angeles. 91 pages.

This short but thought-provoking monograph is intended by the author "only to stimulate the inauguration of a complete research and planning program" which will be essential "to avert social and economic tragedies in Central Valley."

In acknowledging his debt to data supplied by the Reclamation Bureau, the State Engineer's Office, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and by the University of California, the author states that his study is preliminary in character, "to develop a public consciousness of the opportunities for constructive social action which the Central Valley Project offers."

Profusely illustrated with maps, charts, tables, and photographs, the monograph outlines the physical and economic setting of the Central California water problem, and the bold engineering conception, upon which construction is rapidly going forward, to provide the physical basis for an expansion and stabilization of the economy of the great Central Valley.

Yet, in the author's view, the boldness of this conception contrasts sharply with the absence of similar boldness in the development of broad social and economic plans and policies to govern the distribution of costs and benefits arising from the project, the evolution of desirable patterns of land tenure and operation, the protection

of labor in industrialized agriculture, and the distribution of electric power generated at Shasta Dam.

"The situation calls for the formulation of policies designed to put into practical effect long established and sound principles of land use. It is important that new measures be geared to meet the conditions of present-day techniques and existing economic and social needs. The problems involved concern many administrative agencies.

"The Farm Credit Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and the Soil Conservation Service, as well as the Bureau of Reclamation, are engaged in various activities in the project areas. If these agencies could join with existing research and planning organizations in the formulation of a well coordinated program, much could be accomplished. The University of California, State and County Planning Committees, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Office of Irrigation Investigations, the California State Department of Public Works, the State and Federal Departments of Labor, the Farm Bureau Federation, the Grange, and the Farmers Union, all could make important contributions in a coordinated research program.

"The Central Valley Project, in a very definite way, is a major test of the capacity of a political democracy to meet basic economic issues through study and planning. Time, just now, is the essence of success. The dams and canals of the Central Valley Project are under construction. But existing rules and regulations governing land use are wholly inadequate. The power issue is neither settled nor is it fully understood by the potential consumers to be served. The immediate formulation of adequate and sound policies and of a program of action governing land use and power distribution, based upon a thorough study of the facts and issues involved, is imperative if the public interest is to be fully served."

YOUTH AND THE FUTURE; THE GENERAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN YOUTH COMMISSION. Washington, American Council on Education. 296 pages.

Part I of this report is devoted to employment opportunity for youth. It describes the unemployment of young people as a continuing problem; lists experience with youth work programs (specifically the CCC and the NYA); discusses future work programs; takes up the relations between the schools of the country and these work programs; and presents the problem of full employment for these young people.

Part II lists and discusses other basic problems: The needs of youth; education; occupational adjustment; marriage and the home; use of leisure time; health and fitness; delinquency and youthful crime; and citizenship.

Part III, Responsibility for Action for Youth, lists action in communities; action in State governments, the place of the Federal Government; and responsibility for planning in relation to action.

Part IV, In Conclusion, contains one chapter, Meaning for Life.

SOLVING PROBLEMS THROUGH COOPERATION. Summarized from Annual Reports of Twenty Farm Security Administration Farm and Home Supervisors. Rachel Rowe Swiger and Conrad Taeuber. Washington, Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Farm Security Administration. 11 pages.

More than 500 families in 10 counties representing the different sections of the country are participating in an experiment in rehabilitation among disadvantaged farm families unable to qualify for the regular FSA program. This brief report is intended to show in summary fashion the results that have so far been attained.

These families "lacked sufficient land, equipment, security of tenure, and managerial ability to carry out a farm program that would provide an adequate living; nonfarm employment which had once supplemented their meager farm income had dwindled away; many were in poor health because of malnutrition and inadequate clothing and housing facilities."

Some of the results obtained through cooperation are listed.

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The soft snap is one thing that doesn't grow on the farm.
—GADSDEN, ALA., "TIMES"